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Abstract
We consider truthful implementation of the socially e¢ cient allocation in an in-
dependent private-value environment in which agents receive private information over
time. We propose a suitable generalization of the pivot mechanism, based on the mar-
ginal contribution of each agent. In the dynamic pivot mechanism, the ex-post incentive
and ex-post participation constraints are satised for all agents after all histories. In
an environment with diverse preferences it is the unique mechanism satisfying ex-post
incentive, ex-post participation and e¢ cient exit conditions.
We develop the dynamic pivot mechanism in detail for a repeated auction of a single
object in which each bidder learns over time her true valuation of the object. We show
that the dynamic pivot mechanism is equivalent to a modied second price auction.
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In this paper, we generalize the idea of the pivot mechanism (due to Green and La¤ont
(1977b)) to dynamic environments with private information. We design an intertemporal
sequence of transfer payments which allows each agent to receive her ow marginal contri-
bution in every period. In other words, after each history, the expected transfer that each
player must pay coincides with the dynamic externality cost that she imposes on the other
agents. In consequence, each agent is willing to truthfully report her information in every
period.
We consider a general intertemporal model in discrete time and with a common discount
factor. The private information of each agent in each period is her perception of her future
payo¤ path conditional on the realized signals and allocations. We assume throughout that
the information is statistically independent across agents. At the reporting stage of the
direct mechanism, each agent reports her information. The planner then calculates the
e¢ cient allocation given the reported information. The planner also calculates for each
agent i the optimal allocation when agent i is excluded from the mechanism. The total
expected discounted payment of each agent is set equal to the externality cost imposed on
the other agents in the model. In this manner, each player receives as her payment her
marginal contribution to the social welfare in every conceivable continuation game.
With transferable utilities, the social objective is simply to maximize the expected dis-
counted sum of the individual utilities. Since this is essentially a dynamic programming
problem, the solution is by construction time-consistent. In consequence, the dynamic pivot
mechanism is time-consistent and the social choice function can be implemented by a se-
quential mechanism without any ex-ante commitment by the designer.1 Furthermore, the
mechanism yields a net surplus in each period, and therefore the mechanism designer does
not need outside resources to achieve the e¢ cient allocation. Since marginal contributions
1 In revenue-maximizing problems, the ratchet e¤ect leads to very distinct solutions for mechanisms
with and without intertemporal commitment ability, see Baron and Besanko (1984) and Freixas, Guesnerie,
and Tirole (1985).
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are positive by denition, the dynamic pivot mechanism induces all productive agents to
participate in the mechanism after all histories.
In the intertemporal environment there is a multiplicity in transfer schemes that support
the same incentives as the pivot mechanism. In particular, the monetary transfers necessary
to induce the e¢ cient action in period t may become due at some later period s provided
that the net present value of the transfers remains constant. We say that a mechanism
supports e¢ cient exit if an agent who ceases to a¤ect the current and future allocations
also ceases to pay and receive transfers. This condition is similar to the requirement often
made in the scheduling literature that the mechanism be an online mechanism.2 Our
main characterization result shows that in an environment with diverse preferences, the
dynamic pivot mechanism is the only e¢ cient mechanism that satises ex-post incentive
compatibility, ex-post participation and e¢ cient exit conditions.
The basic idea of the dynamic pivot mechanism is rst explored in the context of a
scheduling problem where a set of privately informed bidders compete for the services of
a central facility over time. This class of problems is perhaps the most natural dynamic
analogue to the static single-unit auction. It is easy to see that standard static mechanisms
fail to produce e¢ cient outcomes in the dynamic context. Hence a more complete under-
standing of the intertemporal trade-o¤s in the allocation process is needed. In section 5, we
use the dynamic pivot mechanism to derive the optimal dynamic auction format for a model
where bidders learn their valuations for a single object over time. We use the construct of
the dynamic marginal contribution to derive explicit and informative expressions for the
intertemporal transfer prices.
In recent years, a number of papers have been written with the aim to explore various
issues arising in dynamic allocation problems. Athey and Segal (2007b) consider a similar
model to ours. Their focus is on mechanisms that are budget balanced in every period of
the game. The same repeated game strategies are employed by Athey and Segal (2007a)
with a focus on repeated bilateral trade. In contrast, we emphasize voluntary participation,
in particular the e¢ cient exit condition, as one of the key ingredients of our mechanism.
2The term online mechanism was coined by Lavi and Nisan (2000).
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This allows us to single out the dynamic pivot mechanism in the class of e¢ cient mecha-
nisms. Cavallo, Parkes, and Singh (2006) consider a dynamic Markovian model and derive
a sequence of Groves-like payments which guarantee interim incentive compatibility but not
interim participation constraints. Bapna and Weber (2005) consider a sequential allocation
problem for a single, indivisible object by a dynamic auction. They present necessary and
su¢ cient conditions when an a¢ ne but report-contingent combination of dynamic alloca-
tion indices can represent the externality cost. In contrast, we consider a direct mechanism
and determine the transfers from general principles of the incentive problem. In particu-
lar we do not require any assumptions beyond the independent private-value environment
and transferable utility. In symmetric information environments, Bergemann and Välimäki
(2003), (2006) use the notion of marginal contribution to construct e¢ cient equilibria in
dynamic rst price auctions. In this paper, we emphasize the role of a time-consistent util-
ity ow, namely the ow marginal contribution, to encompass environments with private
information.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets up the general model, introduces the
notion of a dynamic mechanism and denes the equilibrium concept. Section 3 introduces
the main concepts in a simple example. Section 4 analyzes the pivot mechanism in the
general environment. Section 5 analyzes the implications of the general model for a licensing
auction with learning.
2 Model
Uncertainty We consider an environment with private and independent values in a
discrete-time, innite-horizon model. The ow utility of agent i 2 f1; 2; :::; Ig in period
t 2 N is determined by the current allocation at 2 A, the current monetary transfer pi;t 2 R
and a state variable i;t 2 i. The von Neumann Morgenstern utility function ui of agent
i is assumed to be quasi-linear in the monetary transfer:
ui (at; pi;t; i;t) , vi (at; i;t)  pi;t.
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We assume that vi (at; i;t) is nonnegative for all i, at and i;t. The current allocation at 2 A
is an element of a nite set A of possible allocations. The state of the world i;t for agent i
is a general Markov process on a state space i. The aggregate state of the system is given
by the vector
t = (1;t; :::; I;t) 2 Ii=1i , :
The current state i;t and the current action at dene a probability distribution for next
period state variables i;t+1 on i: We assume that this distribution can be represented by
a stochastic kernel Fi (i;t+1; i;t; at).
The utility functions ui () and the probability transition functions Fi(; at; i;t) are com-
mon knowledge at t = 0. There is also a common prior Fi (i;0) regarding the initial type
of each player i, and the common prior is independent across agents. At the beginning of
each period t, each player i observes i;t privately. At the end of each period, an action
at 2 A is chosen and payo¤s for period t are realized. The asymmetric information is there-
fore generated by the private observation of i;t in each period t. We observe that by the
independence of the priors and the stochastic kernels across i, the information of player,
i;t+1 does not depend on j;t for j 6= i. The expected ow payo¤ of every agent is assumed














for some K <1 for all i; all a and all .
The nature of the state space  will depend on the application at hand. At this point,
we should stress that the formulation allows us to accommodate the possibility of random
arrival or random departure of new agents. It is, for example, quite natural to model the







all at 2 A and a random time  at which agent i privately observes her transitions in and
out of the inactive state. We discuss the role of the richness of the signal space and the
associated valuation proles in more detail in the context of Theorem 2 which presents a
uniqueness result for e¢ cient mechanisms.
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Social E¢ ciency All agents discount the future with a common discount factor ; 0 <
 < 1. In an environment with quasi-linear utility, the socially e¢ cient policy is obtained
by maximizing the utilitarian welfare criterion, namely the expected discounted sum of
valuations. Given the Markovian structure of the stochastic process, the socially optimal
program starting in period t at state t can be written simply as











Alternatively, we can represent the social program in its recursive form:






vi (at; i;t) + EW (t+1)
)
:
The socially e¢ cient policy is denoted by a = fat g
1
t=0. In the remainder of the paper
we focus attention on direct mechanisms which truthfully implement the socially e¢ cient
policy a.
The social externality cost of agent i is determined by the optimal continuation plan in
the absence of agent i. It is therefore useful to dene the value of the social program after
removing agent i from the set of agents:

















contribution Mi (t) of agent i at signal t is dened by:
Mi (t) ,W (t) W i (t) : (1)
The marginal contribution is the change in the social value due to the addition of agent i.
Mechanism and Equilibrium A dynamic direct mechanism asks every agent i to re-
port her state i;t in every period t. The report ri;t 2 i may be truthful or not depending
on the incentives provided in the mechanism. The public history in period t is then a
sequence of reports and allocations until period t   1, or ht = (r0; a0; r1; a1; :::rt 1; at 1),
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where each rs = (r1;s; :::; rI;s) is a report prole of the I agents. The set of possible
public histories in period t is denoted by Ht. The sequence of reports by the agents
is part of the public history and hence we assume that the past and current reports of
each agent are observable to all the agents. The private history of agent i in period t
consists of the public history and the sequence of private observations until period t, or
hi;t = (i;0; r0; a0; i;1; r1; a1; :::; i;t 1; rt 1; at 1; i;t) : The set of possible private histories in
period t is denoted by Hi;t. An (e¢ cient) dynamic direct mechanism is then represented
by a a family of allocations and monetary transfers, fat ; ptg
1
t=0, specically a sequence of
allocations:
at : ! (A) ;
and a sequence of monetary transfers:
pt : Ht ! RI ;
such that the decisions in period t respond to the reported information of all agents up to
and including period t. With the focus on e¢ cient mechanisms, the allocation at depends
only on the current state t. In contrast, the determination of the transfer may depend on
the entire history of reports and actions.
In a dynamic direct mechanism, a (pure) reporting strategy for agent i in period t is a
mapping from the private history into the signal space:
ri;t : Hi;t ! i.
For a given mechanism, the expected payo¤ for agent i from reporting strategy ri = fri;tg1t=0





 (rt) ; i;t)  pi (ht; rt)] :
The allocations at (rt) are determined by the current reports rt. Given the mechanism and
the reporting strategies r i, the optimal reporting strategy of bidder i solves a sequential
optimization problem which can be phrased recursively in terms of value functions, or
Vi(hi;t) = max
ri;t2i
E fvi (at (ri;t; r i;t) ; i;t)  pi (ht; ri;t; r i;t) + Vi (hi;t+1)g :
7
The value function Vi (hi;t+1) represents the continuation value of agent i given the current
private history hi;t, the current reports rt, the current allocation at and tomorrows pri-
vate signal i;t+1 as hi;t+1 = (hi;t; rt; at; i;t+1). We say that a dynamic direct mechanism
is interim incentive compatible, if for every agent and every history, truthtelling is a best
response given that all other agents report truthfully. We say that the dynamic direct mech-
anism is periodic ex-post incentive compatible if truthtelling is a best response regardless of
the history and the current signal realization of the other agents.
In the dynamic context, the notion of ex-post incentive compatibility is qualied by
periodic as it is ex-post with respect to all signals received in period t, but not ex-post with
respect to signals arriving after period t. The periodic qualication arises in the dynamic
environment as agent i may receive information at some later time s > t such that in
retrospect she would wish to change the allocation choice in t and hence her report in t.
Finally we dene the interim participation constraints of each agent. After each history
ht, each agent i may opt out (permanently) from the mechanism, and receive the outside
option value Oi (hi;t) :We use payo¤s generated by the e¢ cient policy a i for the remaining
agents to calculate Oi (hi;t) for the rest of the paper.3 The periodic participation constraint
requires that each agents equilibrium payo¤ after each history weakly exceeds Oi (hi;t). For
the remainder of the text we shall say that a mechanism is ex-post incentive compatible and
individually rational if it satises the periodic incentive and participation constraints.
3 Scheduling: An Example
We consider the problem of allocating time to use a central facility among competing agents.
Each agent has a private valuation for the completion of a task which requires the use of
the central facility. The facility has a capacity constraint and can only complete one task
per period. The cost of delaying any task is given by the discount rate  < 1: The agents
are competing for the right to use the facility at the earliest available time. The objective
3The allocation decision a may in itself indicate which players are active in the game. As a result, the
payo¤ to the remaining players will reect the exit decisions through allocation decisions.
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of the social planner is to sequence the tasks over time so as to maximize the sum of the
discounted utilities. In an early contribution, Dolan (1978) developed a static mechanism
to implement a class of related scheduling problems with private information.
An allocation policy in this setting is a sequence of choices at 2 f0; 1; :::; Ig; where
at denotes the bidder chosen in period t: We allow for at = 0 and hence the possibility
that no bidder is selected in t. Each agent has only one task to complete and the value
i;0 2 R+ of the task is constant over time and independent of the realization time (except
for discounting). The transition function is then given by:
i;t+1 = 0 ; if at = i;
i;t+1 = i;t if at 6= i:
The utility function vi (at; i;t) for bidder i from the e¢ cient allocation policy a is given
by:
vi (at; i;t) =
8<: i;t if at = i,0 if otherwise.
For this scheduling model, we nd the marginal contribution of each agent and derive the
associated dynamic pivot mechanism. We determine the marginal contribution of bidder i
by comparing the value of the social program with and without i. With constant valuations
vi () over time for all i, the optimal policy is clearly given by assigning in every period the
alternative j with the highest remaining valuation. To simplify notation, we let
vi , vi (i; i;t) ;
and by convention dene vt , 0 for all t > I. We may assume without loss of generality
(after relabelling) that the valuations vi of the agents are ordered with respect to their
identity i:
v1      vI  0: (2)
The descending order of the valuations of the bidders allows us to identify each alternative






Similarly, the e¢ cient program in the absence of bidder i assigns the bidders in descending








By comparing the social program with and without i, (3) and (4), respectively, we nd
that the assignments for bidders j < i remain unchanged after i is removed, but that each
bidder j > i is allocated the slot one period earlier than in the presence of i. The marginal
contribution of i from the point of view of period 0 is:
Mi (0) =W (0) W i (0) =
IX
t=i
t 1 (vt   vt+1) :
Correspondingly, the present value of marginal contribution of i at the time t = i   1 at
which she realizes her task is
Mi (i 1) =W (i 1) W i (i 1) =
IX
t=i
t i (vt   vt+1) :
The social externality cost of agent i is now established in a straightforward manner. At
time t = i   1, bidder i will complete her task and hence realize a gross value of vi. The
immediate opportunity cost is given by the next highest valuation vi+1. But this alone
would overstate the externality cost, because in the presence of i all less valuable tasks
will now be realized one period later. In other words, the insertion of i into the program
leads to the realization of a relatively more valuable task in all subsequent periods The
externality cost of agent i is hence equal to the value of the next valuable task vi+1 minus
the improvement in future allocations due to the delay of all tasks by one period:
pi (t) = vi+1  
IX
t=i+1
t i (vt   vt+1) . (5)
Since by construction (see (2)), we have vt  vt+1  0, it follows that the externality cost of
agent i in the intertemporal framework is less than in the corresponding single allocation
problem where it would be vi+1. Consequently, we can rewrite (5) to:





which simply states that the externality cost of agent i is the cost of delay imposed on the
remaining and less valuable tasks. With the monetary transfers given by (5), Theorem 1 will
formally establish that the dynamic pivot mechanism leads to thruthtelling with ex-post
incentive and ex-post participation constraints.
We next show that the e¢ cient allocation can be realized through a bidding mechanism
rather than a direct revelation mechanism. We nd a dynamic version of the ascending
price auction where the contemporaneous use of the facility is auctioned. As a given task is
completed, the number of e¤ective bidders decreases by one. We can then use a backwards
induction algorithm to determine the values for the bidders starting from a nal period in
which only a single bidder is left without e¤ective competition.
Consider an ascending auction in which all tasks except that of bidder I have been
completed. Along the e¢ cient path, the nal ascending auction will occur at time t = I 1.
Since all other bidders have vanished along the e¢ cient path at this point, bidder I wins the
nal auction at a price equal to zero. By backwards induction, we consider the penultimate
auction in which the only bidders left are I   1 and I. As agent I can anticipate to win the
auction tomorrow even if she were to loose it today, she is willing to bid at most
bI (vI) = vI    (vI   0) ; (6)
namely the net value gained by winning the auction today rather than tomorrow. Naturally,
a similar argument applies to bidder I 1, by dropping out of the competition today bidder
I   1 would get a net present discounted value of vI 1 and hence her maximal willingness
to pay is given by
bI 1 (vI 1) = vI 1    (vI 1   0) .
Since bI 1 (vI 1)  bI (vI), given vI 1  vI , it follows that bidder I   1 wins the ascending
price auction in t = I   2 and receives a net payo¤:
vI 1   (1  ) vI :
We proceed inductively and nd that the maximal bid of bidder I   k in period t =
11
I   k   1 is given by:







In other words, bidder I   k is willing to bid as much as to be indi¤erent between being
selected today and being selected tomorrow, when she would be able to realize a net valu-
ation of vI k   bI (k 1), but only tomorrow, and so the net gain from being selected today





The maximal bid of bidder I   (k   1) generates the transfer price of bidder I   k and
by solving (7) recursively with the initial condition given by (6), we nd that the price in
the ascending auction equals the externality cost in the direct mechanism. In this class
of scheduling problems, the e¢ cient allocation can therefore be implemented by a bidding
mechanism.4
We end this section with a minor modication of the scheduling model to allow for
multiple tasks. For this purpose it is su¢ cient to consider an example with two bidders.
The rst bidder has an innite series of single-period tasks, each delivering a value of v1.
The second bidder has only a single task with a value v2. The utility function of bidder 1
is thus given by
v1 (at; 1;t) =
8<: v1 if at = 1 for all t,0 if otherwise.
whereas the utility function of bidder 2 is as described earlier.
The socially e¢ cient allocation in this setting either has at = 1 for all t if v1  v2 or
a0 = 2; at = 1 for all t  1 if v1 < v2: For the remainder of this example, we will assume
that v1 > v2: Under this assumption the e¢ cient policy will never complete the task of
4The nature of the recursive bidding strategies bears some similarity to the construction of the bidding
strategies for multiple advertising slots in the keyword auction of Edelman, Ostrovsky, and Schwartz (2007).
In the auction for search keywords, the multiple slots are di¤erentiated by their probability of receiving a
hit and hence generating a value. In the scheduling model here, the multiple slots are di¤erentiated by the
time discount associated with di¤erent access times.
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bidder 2. The marginal contribution of each bidder is:




M2 (0) = 0.
Along any e¢ cient allocation path, we have Mi (0) = Mi (t) for all i and the social
externality cost of agent 1, p1 (t) for all t, is p

1 (t) =   (1  ) v2. The externality cost is
again the cost of delay imposed on the competing bidder, namely (1  ) times the valuation
of the competing bidder. This accurately represent the social externality cost of agent 1 in
every period even though agent 2 will never receive access to the facility.
We contrast the e¢ cient allocation and transfer with the allocation resulting in the
dynamic ascending price auction. For this purpose, suppose that the equilibrium path
generated by the dynamic bidding mechanism would be e¢ cient. In this case bidder 2
would never be chosen and hence would receive a net payo¤ of 0 along the equilibrium
path. But this means that bidder 2 would be willing to bid up to v2 in every period. In
consequence the rst bidder would receive a net payo¤ of v1   v2 in every period and her
discounted sum of payo¤ would then be:
1
1   (v1   v2) < M1 (0) : (8)
But more important than the failure of the marginal contribution is the fact that the
equilibrium will not support the e¢ cient assignment policy. To see this, notice that if
bidder 1 looses to bidder 2 in any single period, then the task of bidder 2 is completed and
bidder 2 will drop out of the auction in all future stages. Hence the continuation payo¤ for
bidder 1 from dropping out in a given period and allowing bidder 2 to complete his task is
given by:

1   v1: (9)
If we compare the continuation payo¤s (8) and (9) respectively, then we see that it is





but the e¢ ciency condition is simply v1  v2. It follows that for a large range of valuations,
the outcome in the ascending auction is ine¢ cient and will assign the object to bidder 2
despite the ine¢ ciency of this assignment. The reason for the ine¢ ciency is easy to detect
in this simple setting. The forward looking bidders consider only their individual net payo¤s
in future periods. The planner on the other hand is interested in the level of gross payo¤s
in the future periods. As a result, bidder 1 is strategically willing and able to depress the
future value of bidder 2 by letting bidder 2 win today to increase the future di¤erence in
the valuations between the two bidders. But from the point of view of the planner, the
di¤erential gains for bidder 1 is immaterial and the assignment to bidder 2 represents an
ine¢ ciency. The rule of the ascending price auction, namely that the highest bidder wins,
only internalizes the individual equilibrium payo¤s but not the social payo¤s.
This small extension to multiple tasks shows that the logic of the marginal contribution
mechanism can account for subtle intertemporal changes in the payo¤s. On the other hand,
common bidding mechanisms may not resolve the dynamic allocation problem in an e¢ cient
manner. Indirectly, it suggests that suitable indirect mechanisms have yet to be devised for
scheduling and other sequential allocation problems.
4 The Dynamic Pivot Mechanism
We now construct the dynamic pivot mechanism for the general model described in Section
2 The marginal contribution of agent i is her contribution to the social value. In the dynamic
pivot mechanism, the marginal contribution will also be the information rent that agent i
can secure for herself if the planner wishes to implement the socially e¢ cient allocation.
In a dynamic setting if agent i can secure her marginal contribution in every continuation
game of the mechanism, then she should be able to receive the ow marginal contribution
mi (t) in every period. The ow marginal contribution accrues incrementally over time
and is dened recursively:
Mi (t) = mi (t) + EMi (t+1) :
14
The ow marginal contribution can be expressed directly in terms of the social value func-
tions, using the denition of the marginal contribution given in (1), as:
mi (t) =W (t) W i (t)  E [W (t+1) W i (t+1)] . (10)
We can further replace the value functions W (t) and W i (t) by the corresponding ow
payo¤s and continuation payo¤s to express the ow marginal contribution of agent i in
terms of ow and continuation payo¤s. The continuation payo¤s of the social programs
with and without i, respectively, may be governed by di¤erent transition probabilities as
the respective social decisions in period t, at , at (t) and a i;t , at ( i;t), may di¤er. We
denote the expected continuation value of the socially optimal programs, conditional on the
current state and the current action, by:
W (t+1 jat; t ) , EF (t+1;at;t)W (t+1) ;
where the transition from state t to state t+1 is controlled by the allocation at. For
notational ease we omit the expectations operator E from the conditional expectation. We
adopt the same notation for the marginal contributions Mi () and the individual value















W i (t+1 jat ; t ) W i
 
t+1
a i;t; t  .
(11)
A monetary transfer pi (t) such that the resulting ow net utility matches the ow
marginal contribution leads agent i to internalize her social externalities:
pi (t) , vi (at ; i;t) mi (t) : (12)
We refer to pi (t) as the transfer of the dynamic pivot mechanism. We observe that the
transfer pi (t) depends only on the current report t and does not depend on the past public
history ht. Inserting (11) into (12) we can express the transfer payment of the dynamic
















a i;t; t  W i (t+1 jat ; t ) :
(13)
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The transfer price (13) for agent i depends on the report of agent i only through the
determination of the social allocation which is a prominent feature already in the static
Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanisms. The monetary transfers pi (t) are always non-negative
as the policy a i;t is by denition an optimal policy to maximize the social value of all agents
exclusive of i. It follows that in every period t the sum of the monetary transfers across all
agents generates a weak budget surplus.
Theorem 1 (Dynamic Pivot Mechanism)
The dynamic pivot mechanism fat ; pt g
1
t=0 is ex-post incentive compatible and individually
rational.
Proof. By the unimprovability principle, it su¢ ces to prove that if agent i receives as
her continuation value her marginal contribution, then truthtelling is incentive compatible
for agent i in period t, or:
vi (a

t (t) ; i;t)  pi (t) + Mi (t+1 jat ; t )  (14)
vi (a

t (ri;t;  i;t) ; i;t)  pi (ri;t;  i;t) + Mi (t+1 jat (ri;t;  i;t) ; t ) ;
for all ri;t 2 i and all  i;t 2  i, where at = a (i;t;  i;t) is the socially e¢ cient
allocation if the report is ri;t = i;t. By construction of the transfer price pi in (13), the
lhs of (14) represents the marginal contribution of agent i. We can express Mi (t+1 jat ; t )
and Mi (t+1 jat (ri;t;  i;t) ; t ), respectively, in terms of the values of the di¤erent social
programs to get:
W (t) W i (t)  vi (at (ri;t;  i;t) ; i;t)  pi (ri;t;  i;t) (15)
+ (W (t+1 jat (ri;t;  i;t) ; t ) W i (t+1 jat (ri;t;  i;t) ; t )) :
By construction of pi , we can represent the transfer that agent i would pay if allocation
a (ri;t;  i;t) were chosen in terms of the marginal contribution if the reported signal ri;t
were the true signal received by agent i. We can then insert the transfer price (13) into (15)
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to obtain:
















t (ri;t;  i;t) ; j;t) + W (t+1 jat (ri;t;  i;t) ; t ) :
But now we can reconstitute the entire expression in terms of the social value of the program,
with and without agent i, and we are lead to the nal inequality:





t (ri;t;  i;t) ; j;t) + W (t+1 jat (ri;t;  i;t) ; t ) W i (t) :
The above inequality holds for all ri;t by the social optimality of at (t) in state t.
The dynamic pivot mechanism species a unique monetary transfer in every period and
after every history. This mechanism guarantees that the ex-post incentive and ex-post par-
ticipation constraints are satised after every history ht. In the intertemporal environment,
each agent evaluates the monetary transfers to be paid in terms of the expected discounted
transfers, but is indi¤erent (up to discounting) about the incidence of the transfers over
time. This temporal separation between allocative decisions and monetary decisions may
be undesirable for many reasons. First, if the agents and the principal do not have the
ability to commit to future transfer payments, then delays in payments become problem-
atic. In consequence, an agent which is not pivotal should not receive or make a payment.
Second, if it is costly (in a lexicographic sense) to maintain accounts of future monetary
commitments, then the principal wants to close down (as early as possible) the accounts of
those agents who are no longer pivotal.5
This motivates the following e¢ cient exit condition. Let state  i in period  i be a state




at (t) 6= a i;t (t) ;8t   i j i

= 0:
We now say that a mechanism satises the e¢ cient exit condition if for every agent i the
end of her allocative inuence coincides with the end of her monetary transfers .
5We would like to thank an anonymous referee for the suggestion to consider the link between exit and
uniqueness of the transfer rule.
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Denition 1 (E¢ cient Exit)
A dynamic direct mechanism satises the e¢ cient exit condition if for all i;  i;  i :
pi ( i) = 0:
We now establish the uniqueness of the dynamic pivot mechanism in an environment
with diverse preferences and the e¢ cient exit condition. The assumption of diverse pref-
erences allows for rich preferences over the current allocations and indi¤erence over future
allocations. We maintain this assumption for the remainder of the paper.
Assumption 1 (Diverse Preferences)















8<: x if at = a;0 if at 6= a; ;
and for all at; Fi
 





The rst part of the diverse preference assumption assigns to each agent a state in
which she gets no payo¤ from any allocation, and that this state is an absorbing state. The
second part requires that each agent have a state in which she has a positive valuation x for
a specic current allocation a and no value for other current or future allocations. Assuming
diverse preferences is similar to imposing the rich domain conditions introduced in Green
and La¤ont (1977a) and Moulin (1986) to establish the uniqueness of the Groves and the
Pivot mechanism in a static environment. Relative to their conditions, we augment the
diverse (ow) preferences with the certain transition into the absorbing state 0i . With this
transition we ensure that the diverse ow preferences continue to matter in the intertemporal
environment.
The assumption of diverse preference in conjunction with the e¢ cient exit condition
guarantees that in every dynamic direct mechanism there are some types, specically the
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types of the form a;xi , that receive exactly the ow transfers they would have received in
the dynamic pivot mechanism.
Lemma 1
If fat ; ptg
1
t=0 is ex-post incentive compatible and individually rational, and satises the ef-
cient exit condition, then:
pi (ht; 
a;x




i ;  i;t) , for all i; a; x; t; ht.
Proof. Consider any arbitrary history ht and type realization (
a;x
i ;  i;t) in period t.
The ex-post incentive constraints of type a;xi at type prole (
a;x
i ;  i;t) are:
vi (a
 (a;xi ;  i;t) ; 
a;x
i )  pi (ht; 
a;x
i ;  i;t) + Vi (hi;t+1 ja
 (a;xi ;  i;t) ; (
a;x
i ;  i;t)) 
vi (a
 (ri;t;  i;t) ; 
a;x
i )  pi (ht; ri;t;  i;t) + Vi (hi;t+1 ja
 (ri;t;  i;t) ; (
a;x
i ;  i;t)) ;
for all ri;t: Given (
a;x
i ;  i;t), the continuation payo¤ for i along the equilibrium path
satises Vi (hi;t+1 ja (a;xi ;  i;t) ; (
a;x
i ;  i;t)) = 0 by the e¢ cient exit condition.
In the dynamic pivot mechanism, if the valuation x of type a;xi for allocation a exceeds







a i ( i;t) ; j;t







a i ( i;t) ;  i;t   W i ( i;t+1 ja;  i;t ) ,
then the transfer price pi (
a;x
i ;  i;t) would be:
pi (
a;x






a i ( i;t) ; j;t






a i ( i;t) ;  i;t   W i ( i;t+1 ja;  i;t )
otherwise it would be equal to zero.
We now argue by contradiction. By the ex-post incentive compatibility constraints, all
types a;xi of agent i where x satises the inequality (16) must pay the same transfer. To
see this, suppose that for x; y 2 R+ satisfying (16)
pi (ht; 
a;x
i ;  i;t) < pi (ht; 
a;y
i ;  i;t) .
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Now type a;yi has a strict incentive to mis-report ri;t = 
a;x
i , a contradiction. We therefore
denote the constant transfer for all a;xi and x satisfying (16) by pi (ht; a;  i;t) and the
corresponding dynamic pivot transfer by pi (a;  i;t).
Suppose next that pi (ht; a;  i;t) > pi (a;  i;t) :This implies that the ex-post participa-
tion constraint for some x with pi (ht; a;  i;t) > x > pi (a;  i;t) is violated, contradicting
the hypothesis of the lemma. Suppose to the contrary that pi (ht; a;  i;t) < pi (a;  i;t),
and consider the ex-post incentive constraints of a type a;xi with a valuation x such that
pi (ht; a;  i;t) < x < p

i (a;  i;t) : (17)
If the inequality (17) is satised then it follows that a (a;xi ;  i;t) = a

 i ( i;t), and in
particular that a (a;xi ;  i;t) 6= a. If the ex-post incentive constraint of type 
a;x
i were
satised, then we would have
vi (a
 (a;xi ;  i;t) ; 
a;x
i )  pi (ht; 
a;x
i ;  i;t)  vi (a; 
a;x
i )  pi (ht; a;  i;t) . (18)
Given that i = 
a;x
i , we can thus rewrite (18) as:
0  pi (ht; a;xi ;  i;t)  x  pi (ht; a;  i;t) :
But given (17), this implies that pi (ht; 
a;x
i ;  i;t) < 0. In other words, type 
a;x
i receives a
strictly positive subsidy even though her report is not pivotal for the social allocation as
a (a;xi ;  i;t) = a

 i ( i;t). Now, a negative transfer (i.e. a positive subsidy) necessarily
violates the ex-post incentive constraint of the absorbing type 0i . By the e¢ cient exit
condition, type 0i should not receive any contemporaneous (or future) subsidies. But by
mis-reporting her type to be a;xi , type 
0
i would gain access to a positive subsidy without
changing the social allocation, which would leave her with a strictly positive net utility. It
thus follows that pi (ht; 
a;x




i ;  i;t) for all a and all x.
Given that the transfers of the dynamic pivot mechanism are part of every dynamic
direct mechanism with diverse preferences, we next establish that every type i;0 in t = 0 has
to receive the same ex-ante expected utility as she would in the dynamic pivot mechanism.
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Lemma 2
If fat ; ptg
1
t=0 is ex-post incentive compatible and individually rational, and satises the ef-
cient exit condition, then for all i and all 0: Vi (0) =Mi (0).
Proof. The argument is by contradiction. Consider an i such that Vi (0) 6= Mi (0).
Suppose rst that Vi (0) > Mi (0). Then there is a history h and a state  such that
pi (h ;  ) < p

i ( ). The socially e¢ cient allocation in state  is denoted a

 , a ( ).
We now show that such a transfer pi (h ;  ) leads to a violation of the ex-post incentive
constraint for some type a;xi 2 i. Specically consider a type 
a ;x
i such that pi (h ;  ) <
























a a ;xi ;  i; ;  
 x  pi (h ;  ) + Vi

hi;+1
a (ri; ;  i; ) ; a ;xi ;  i;  > 0;
leading to a contradiction.
Suppose next that
Mi (0)  Vi (0) > "; (19)
for some " > 0. By hypothesis of ex-post incentive condition we have for all ri;0:
Mi (0)  [vi (a0 (ri;0;  i;0) ; i;0)  pi (h0; ri;0;  i;0) + Vi (hi;1 ja0 (ri;0;  i;0) ; i;0 )] > ".
(20)
But by Lemma 1, we know that there exists a report ri;0 = 
a(0);x
i for agent i such that
a (0) is induced at the price pi (0) associated with the dynamic pivot mechanism. After
inserting ri;0 = 
a(0);x
i into (20) and observing that
vi (a

0 (ri;0;  i;0) ; i;0)  pi (h0; ri;0;  i;0) = mi (0) ,
we are lead to conclude that
 (Mi (1)  Vi (hi;1 ja0 (ri;0;  i;0) ; i;0 )) > ",
or





But now we can repeat the argument we started with (19) and nd that there is a path of
realizations of 0; :::; t, such that the di¤erence between the marginal contribution and the
value function of agent i grows without bound. But the marginal contribution of agent i is
nite given that the expected ow utility of agent i is bounded by some K > 0, and thus
eventually the ex-post participation constraint of the agent is violated, and we obtain the
desired contradiction.
The above lemma can be viewed as a revenue equivalence results of all (e¢ cient) dy-
namic direct mechanisms. As we are analyzing a dynamic allocation problem with an innite
horizon, we cannot appeal to the revenue equivalence results established for static mecha-
nisms. In particular, the statement of the standard revenue equivalence results involve a
xed utility for the lowest type. In the innite horizon model here, the diverse preference
assumption give us a natural candidate of a lowest type in terms of 0i , and the e¢ cient
exit condition determines her utility. The remaining task is to argue that among all in-
tertemporal transfers with the same expected discounted value, only the time prole of the
dynamic pivot mechanism satises the relevant conditions. Alternative payments streams
could either require an agent to pay earlier or later relative to the dynamic pivot transfers.
If the payments were to occur later, payments would have to be lower in an earlier period
by the above revenue equivalence result. This would open the possibility for a short-lived
type a;xi to induce action a at a price below the dynamic pivot transfer and hence violate
incentive compatibility. The reverse argument applies if the payments were to occur earlier
relative to the dynamic pivot transfer, for example if the agent were to be asked to post a
bond at the beginning of the mechanism.
Theorem 2 (Uniqueness)
If fat ; ptg
1
t=0 is ex-post incentive compatible and individually rational, and satises the ef-
cient exit condition, then it is the dynamic pivot mechanism.
Proof. The proof is by contradiction. Suppose not, then by Lemma 2 there exists a
player i, a history h and an associated state i; such that pi (h ;  ) 6= pi ( ). Suppose
rst that pi (h ;  ) < pi ( ). We show that the current monetary transfer pi (h ;  ) leads
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to the violation of the ex-post incentive constraint of some type a;xi . The socially e¢ cient
allocation at the true prole  is given by a = a
 ( ). Consider now a type 
a ;x
i with a
valuation x for the allocation a such that x > p

i ( ). Her ex-post incentive constraint is
given by
vi (a
 (a;xi ;  i;t) ; 
a;x
i )  pi (ht; 
a;x
i ;  i;t) + Vi (hi;t+1 ja
 (ri;t;  i;t) ; (
a;x
i ;  i;t)) 
vi (a
 (ri;t;  i;t) ; i;t)  pi (ht; ri;t;  i;t) + Vi (hi;t+1 ja (ri;t;  i;t) ; (a;xi ;  i;t)) :
By the e¢ cient exit condition, we have
Vi (hi;t+1 ja (ri;t;  i;t) ; (a;xi ;  i;t)) = Vi (hi;t+1 ja
 (ri;t;  i;t) ; (
a;x
i ;  i;t)) = 0:
By Lemma 1, we also have that pi (ht; 
a;x




i ;  i;t) = p

i ( ). Consider
then the report of ri; = i; by type 
a;x
i . The ex-post incentive constraints now reads: x 
pi ( )  x pi (h ;  ), which leads to a contradiction as by hypothesis we had pi (h ;  ) <
pi ( ).
Suppose next that pi (h ;  ) > pi ( ). Now by Lemma 2, it follows that the ex-ante
expected payo¤ is equal to the value of the marginal contribution of agent i in period 0. It
therefore follows from pi (h ;  ) > pi ( ) that there also exists another time 
0 and state
 0 such that pi (h ;  ) < pi ( ). By repeating the argument in the rst part of the proof,
we obtain a contradiction.
We should reiterate that in the denition of the ex-post incentive and participation con-
ditions, we required that a candidate mechanism satises these conditions after all possible
histories of past reports. It is in the spirit of the ex-post constraints that these constraints
hold for all possible states rather than strictly positive probability events. In the context
of establishing the uniqueness of the mechanism it allows us to use the diverse preference
condition without making additional assumption about the transition probability from a
given state i;t into a specic state 
a;x
i . We merely require the existence of these types in
the establishing the above result.
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5 Learning and Licensing
In this section, we show how our general model can be interpreted as one where the bidders
learn gradually about their preferences for an object that is auctioned repeatedly over time.
We use the insights from the general pivot mechanism to deduce properties of the e¢ cient
allocation mechanism. A primary example of an economic setting that ts this model is the
leasing of a resource or license over time.
In every period t; a single indivisible object can be allocated to a bidder i 2 f1; :::; Ig,
and the allocation decision at 2 f1; 2; :::; Ig simply determines which bidder gets the object
in period t: In order to describe the uncertainty explicitly, we assume that the true valuation
of bidder i is given by !i 2 
i = [0; 1]. Information in the model represents therefore the
bidders prior and posterior beliefs on !i: In period 0, bidder i does not know the realization
of !i, but she has a prior distribution i;0 (!i) on 
i. The prior and posterior distributions
on 
i are assumed to be independent across bidders. In each subsequent period t, only
the winning bidder in period t   1 receives additional information leading to an updated
posterior distribution i;t on 
i according to Bayesrule. If bidder i does not win in period
t, we assume that she gets no information, and consequently the posterior is equal to the
prior. In the dynamic direct mechanism, the bidders simply report their posteriors at each
stage.
The socially optimal assignment over time is a standard multiarmed bandit problem
and the optimal policy is characterized by an index policy (see Gittins (1989) and Whittle
(1982) for a textbook introduction). In particular, we can compute for every bidder i the
Gittins index based exclusively on the information about bidder i. The index of bidder i
after private history hi;t is the solution to the following optimal stopping problem:









where at+l is the path in which alternative i is chosen l times following a given past alloca-
tion (a0; :::; at) ; and where the expectation is taken with respect to the realized posteriors
i;t+l: An important property of the index policy is that the index of alternative i can be
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computed independent of any information about the other alternatives. In particular, the
index of bidder i remains constant if bidder i does not win the object. The socially e¢ cient
allocation policy a = fat g
1
t=0 is to choose in every period a bidder i if:
i (hi;t)  j (hj;t) for all j:
In the dynamic direct mechanism, we construct a transfer price such that under the
e¢ cient allocation, each bidders net payo¤ coincides with her ow marginal contribution
mi (t). We consider rst the payment of the bidder i who has the highest index in state t
and who should therefore receive the object in period t. In order to match her net payo¤
to her ow marginal contribution, we must have:
mi (t) = vi (hi;t)  pi (t) : (21)
The remaining bidders, j 6= i, should not receive the object in period t and their transfer
price must o¤set the ow marginal contribution: mj (t) =  pj (t). We expand the ow
marginal contribution in (21) by noting that i is the e¢ cient assignment and that another
bidder, say k, would constitute the e¢ cient assignment in the absence of bidder i:
mi (t) = vi (hi;t)  vk (hk;t)   (W i (t+1 ji; t ) W i (t+1 jk; t )) :
We notice that with private values, the continuation value of the social program without i
but conditional on the object being assigned to agent i in period t is simply equal to the
value of the program conditional on t alone, or
W i (t+1 ji; t ) =W i (t) :
The additional information generated by the assignment to agent i only pertains to agent
i and hence has no value for the allocation problem once i is removed. We can therefore
rewrite the ow marginal contribution of the winning agent i as:
mi (t) = vi (hi;t)  (1  )W i (t) :
It follows that the transfer price should simply be given by pi (t) = (1  )W i (t), which
is the ow social opportunity cost of assigning the object today to agent i. A similar analysis
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leads to the conclusion that the losing bidders makes zero payments: pj (t) =  mj (t) = 0.
Our main result in this section collects this information on the transfers in the dynamic
pivot mechanism.
Theorem 3 (Dynamic Second Price Auction)
The socially e¢ cient allocation rule a is ex-post incentive compatible in the dynamic direct
mechanism with the payment rule p where:
pj (t) =
8<: (1  )W j (t) if at = j;0 if at 6= j:
The incentive compatible pricing rule has a few interesting implications. First, we
observe that in the case of two bidders, the formula for the dynamic second price reduces to
the static solution. If we remove one bidder, the social program has no other choice but to
always assign it to the remaining bidder. But then, the expected value of that assignment
policy is simply equal to the expected value of the object for bidder j in period t by the
martingale property of the Bayesian posterior. In other words, the transfer is equal to the
current expected value of the next best competitor. It should be noted, though, that the
object is not necessarily assigned to the bidder with the highest current ow payo¤.
With more than two bidders, the ow value of the social program without bidder i is
di¤erent from the ow value of any remaining alternative. Since there are at least two
bidders left after excluding i; the planner has the option to abandon any chosen alternative
if its value happens to fall su¢ ciently. This option value increases the social ow payo¤ and
hence the transfer that the e¢ cient bidder must pay. In consequence the social opportunity
cost is higher than the highest expected valuation among the remaining bidders.
Second, we observe that the transfer price of the winning bidder is independent of her
own information about the object. This means that for all periods in which the ownership
of the object does not change, the transfer price stays constant as well, even though the
value of the object to the winning bidder may change.
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